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AN ABSTRACT OF THE RESEARCH PAPER OF 
 
QAISS KHAN ALOKOZAI, for the MASTER OF ARTS degree in ECONOMICS, at Southern Illinois 
University Carbondale 
 
TITLE: CRACKING THE CODE OF CORRUPTION: The Case of Afghanistan  
 
MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Scott Gilbert 
 
 This paper is about a very complicated and multifaceted issue of corruption. The main 
purpose of this paper is to find the impact of development indicators which are political 
stability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and 
accountability on the control of corruption in Afghanistan. Furthermore we are interested to 
know the direction of causality among these variables. The data is analyzed through ordinary 
least square regression method. Johansen test is applied for cointegration and to find the 
causality we have applied the Granger causality test. Political Stability and violence, 
government effectiveness and voice and accountability have shown very strong results and can 
have higher impact. Policy recommendations are made at the end of the paper.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction  
In Afghanistan people use different terms to camouflage the practice of corruption. 
Some of the customary terms used are Shirini (sweets), Rishwat (Bribe), Tea Money, Bakhsish 
and Fruits for your children. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in south Asia; indeed 
Afghanistan is a rich country in terms of its natural resources, agriculture and tourism but there 
are many problems and opposing forces to the development of Afghanistan. Corruption is one 
of those divergent forces that are becoming a hurdle in front of the international community 
efforts to bring development in the country. The country has been through long term turmoil 
and internal political disturbances from the last 30 years. As a result Afghanistan is becoming a 
country which is called a failed state.  
Corruption is prevalent in many countries but the ratio is significantly higher in under 
developed countries. Afghanistan is one such case.  The type of governance acts as a catalyst in 
a country’s progress. The world governance indicators as described by World Bank are voice 
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Afghanistan has the lowest rank and 
estimated points in all these indicators as per the survey. According to the humanitarian 
assistance organization the total pledge to the government of Afghanistan from 2002 to 2009 
was a total of 62 billion US dollar. A total of 26.7 billion US dollars have already being disbursed 
through different projects in Afghanistan. These projects comprise projects in various sectors 
like education, agriculture, governance, anti-corruption, rural development, anti-narcotics and 
many other economical sectors. But still the government of Afghanistan has failed to provide 
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people with basic needs. A survey conducted by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
reveals that “bribery had a major impact on Afghanistan’s economy amounting to a total of 3.9 
billion dollars” (p. 05). The corrupt system inside the government ministries is becoming a vital 
force in reducing the pace of development. The international community has done ample 
efforts to provide assistance both technical and capital to enable government of Afghanistan 
with required tools that will enable them to reduce corruption. But the performance of the 
government of Afghanistan has very lower result in this case.  
The topic became of significant importance to me when I observed the problem while 
working in close coordination with the public sector in Afghanistan. The ministries as well as the 
top government officials are all infected by this virus. The recent news reports show a highly 
corrupt system in the parliament as well as among ministers. In order to get a passport, 
attesting or receiving your educational degrees, paying your bills, admitting your kids to school, 
the person has to pay bribe in order to go through the system. Adam J. Center (2008) states 
that “imagine being a teacher and having to pay a bribe for your paycheck, imagine being a 
parent and having to pay a bribe for your child to received a passing grade, imagine being an 
employer and being unable to decipher between authentic diplomas and the counterfeit 
replicas” (p. 848).   
In the higher level government positions such as the parliament or ministers this is a 
more a severe problem. For a contractor to apply for bid participation he has to pay bribe to 
higher officials in order to be part of an open announced bidding for a project. The result 
became that these contractors then after paying bribe implement the projects with lower 
quality products and there is no guarantee of the sustainability of the project. Kinzer (1999) as 
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cited by Svanson (1999) state that the consequence of the earthquake of 2004 in Turkey would 
be much lower if contractors have not paid bribes and as result using lower standard materials 
(p. 20). The projects which are implemented due to corruption the reliability of these projects 
are to the lowest degree.  
Still with this high level of corruption, from education sector to health, from transport to 
aviation, agriculture to commerce people do manage to be part of the system. Leff (1964) 
believes that “corruption is another less radical way of adjusting to the same pressures and 
goals” (p. 100). The public sector is designed and encoded in a way that; in order to function 
well, the citizens are indirectly forced to obey the coding rules (corruption favored). The 
general people are ruled by some bureaucrats and they are not free in their course of actions. 
Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson in their paper “economic freedom versus political freedom” 
argues that lower government intervention and more economically free countries are more 
developed and citizens of that country enjoy democracy (p. 122). There is neither political nor 
economic freedom in Afghanistan.  
Afghanistan is a strongly segregated country in terms of ethnic groups. Paulo Mauro 
(1995) in his paper titled “corruption and growth” has used empirical approach of ethno 
linguistic fractionalization. His findings show that members of the same ethno linguistic group 
will always favor their own group member (p. 693). Mauro has presented a very accurate 
picture of Afghanistan in his findings. In Afghanistan Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazars, Uzbeks are some 
of the major ethnic groups. A strong tribal connection in different sectors of the governments, 
always favor their own tribal members. Beside this Jeanet Sinding Bentzen (2012) as well as 
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Rose-Ackerman (1999), states that corruption is ubiquitous in cultures with a strong social 
group philosophy which results in group favored decisions (p. 168). 
The public sector is highly corrupt and bureaucratic in Afghanistan. Government 
positions from top to lower are bought through bribes and connections. The ministries in the 
country are functioning based on the old system. The international community has provided all 
kinds of modern technology but the civil service employees usually all employees of 
government cannot work on computers and prefer to work on the same old system. The public 
sector has a huge hierarchical structure, where you an employee should show and do what his 
higher authorities are ordering him. Bentzen (2012), Hofsted (2001), has termed such action as 
“power distances” (p. 168). According to their findings such societies with a greater power 
distance are more corrupt and less developed (p. 168). As a result of power distances in 
Afghanistan there is substantial difference in income inequality throughout the country. The 
citizens who can are in better position in terms of their contacts and networks are better off in 
comparison to the poor citizens of the society. Gupta, Davoodi & Terme (2011) states that as a 
result of prevalence of higher differences in income and poverty will result in more 
corruption…one point increment in standard deviation of corruption will bring changes of 
increment of 11 points in gini coefficient and poor people income will grow by 5 percentage 
point (p. 23).  
Gupta, Davoodi and Terre (2001) have mentioned good point about poor targeting of 
social programs where social programs are implemented in a wrong target place; instead they 
are more favored to already well connect people (p.25). 
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The civil service employees claim in Afghanistan that due to lower wages of the civil 
sector they can only compensate that through bribes. Wie (1997) argues that lower wages by 
the government can be a reason of corruption…...he has given example of Singapore’s Prime 
Minister’s action in terms of paying higher wages to civil service employees as competitive as 
the private sector (p. 19). This can be true in many hierarchical levels where they are paid less 
but it is prevalent on the ministerial as well as parliamentary level in Afghanistan. There are 
many support staff working with the ministry by funding provided by international donors and 
are paid a competitive salary but they are paving a way for corruption by issuing contracts 
through illegal ways. Rauch and Evans (1997) have also rejected this hypothesis about the role 
of competitive salary to reduce corruption (p. 19). 
Research Question 
1. Which of the World Bank development indicators have higher impact on the control of 
corruption in Afghanistan? 1) voice and accountability 2)political stability 3)government 
effectiveness 4)regulatory quality 5)rule of law and 6)control of corruption.  
2. What is the direction of the causality between the variables? 
Definitions 
Scholars have given various definitions of corruption. Some of them are giving below.  
Aidt, (2003) state that corruption means where the government officials are using their official 
position to benefit themselves (p. 01).  
The World Bank & Charron. N (2010) in his paper “Exploring the impact of foreign aid on 
corruption” has defined corruption as “the abuse of public office for the private gain” (p. 68).   
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Wei (1999) defines corruption as “government officials abusing their power to extract/accept 
bribes from the private sector for personal benefits” (p. 04). 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
Corruption is a multidimensional issue with a stronger negative impact on economic and 
social aspects of a country. In Afghanistan corruption has strong roots in the government 
sector. There can be various factors that are causing these roots to be stronger. These factors 
can be cultural, war and internal turmoil, lack of education, lower wages in public sector, 
political instability, poverty, lack of accountability, weak judicial system to name a few.   In this 
section we will review scholarly articles on the topic of corruption.  
Corruption leads a country to a path of economic insecurity and long term negative 
consequences on economic development. There are so many seminal research been done to 
show the negative impact of corruption on economic prosperity. Paolo Mauro (1995) in his 
paper “corruption and growth” has shown that corruption can result in lowering the investment 
in the country and as a result has an overall impact on economic growth (p. 681). Mauro has 
made a good point related to the link between corruption and investment. In Afghanistan 
investors are not willing to invest and one of the main reasons behind that is; lack of security, 
no rule of law, corruption and bureaucracy in government sector. Investment is very low in the 
country. Shang-Jin Wei (1999) in his paper titled “corruption in economic development, 
beneficial grease minor annoyance or major obstacle” presents corruption in this way. He 
states that corruption is a crucial problem for a country where it results in lowering domestic 
investment, foreign direct investment, and inflation of government spending which results in 
shifting it away from spending the capital on education, health and infrastructure (p. 02). 
Investors are investing in neighboring countries like India and Tajikistan and in Middle East as in 
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Dubai. Mauro (1995) has given an example of an action if taken by Bangladesh increase the 
investment in Bangladesh would raise by almost 5 percentage point and its GDP by half 
percentage point (p. 683). The results from Mauro’s (1995) work also found that a percentage 
increase in the corruption index will result in an increase of 2.9 percent of investment rate. 
Furthermore Mauro (1996) showed that a percentage improvement in bureaucratic efficiency 
index will result in 4.75 percent of GDP.  
Ata and Arvas in their paper “determinants of economics corruption: a cross country 
data analysis” have focused on the distribution of income and how does it impact growth. They 
found out that “economic development, inflation, economic freedom and income distribution 
are statistically significant determinants of corruption” (p. 161). Ata & Arvas have presented a 
perfect description of the determinants of corruption in Afghanistan however inflation does not 
seem to be a determinant of corruption in Afghanistan. The lower economic development and 
a high difference in income distribution in Afghanistan are causing a significant increase in 
corruption in the country. Jeanet Sinding Bentzen in his paper titled “how bad is corruption? 
Cross country evidence of the impact of corruption on economic prosperity” has mentioned a 
strong negative consequence of corruption on a country’s productivity level (p. 167). Aidt 
(1999) results also provide significant evidence that corruption can hinder economic growth (p. 
288). Wright & Craigwell (2001) have found that the hypothesis that corruption can have 
impact on economic growth depends on the statistical methods that they have used…they have 
found strong causal relationship from corruption to economic growth but a weaker link from 
economic growth to corruption (p. 38). Svensson (2005) supports the notion arguing that 
“corruption is closely related to GDP per capita and to human capital” (p. 29). I strongly agree 
9 
 
 
 
with Svensson on the point of human capital. Afghanistan has the lowest human capital. There 
is no investment in this case.  
Bentzen (2012) has further questioned the badness of corruption for a country. He 
believes that in order to understand and analyze the severity of this problem we have to figure 
out which weaker aspect of the governments to fix first (p. 167). The author has asked and 
assessed the issue through a very logical question. In Afghanistan the corruption is becoming a 
cancerous cell. But in order to fight it afghan people as well as anti corruption organization 
would need to know which kind of cancer it is and in which part of the society. Almost all the 
public sector is severely infected but the impact is on general people of the country and they 
are not taking any kind of action against it. Bentzen agrees with (Licht er al. 2007) that societies 
with collective and group nature, the decisions made are ceterus paribus. In this way an easy 
deal is made without the fear of questioning from the same group member (p. 174). Wright & 
Craigwell in their paper have cited Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 2005) and agrees that 
corruption can have a significant impact on human capital accumulation. Furthermore Amaro-
Reynes (1983), Mauro (1995, 1997), United Nations (2001) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) all 
have found out that corruption is seem to cause wrong implementation of projects to areas 
where it is easy to get bribes, and the projects are of low productivity rather than investment 
enhancing projects (p. 23).  
The poor citizens of Afghanistan are highly affected by corruption. They have limited 
resources in order to process and be part of the system. They are deprived of their most basic 
rights. IWA Corruption survey of 2010 mentions about their finding related to impact of 
corruption of poor as “households in villages close to cities are more likely to pay briber then 
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those in remote villages or in cities. Single breadwinner households with an income of less 
thatn 3000 Afs (60 US) are the most exposed to bribery….poor farmers are more likely to pay 
bribe than those in urban areas.  
Aidt (2009) states that, “corruption is one of the causes of low income and is believed to 
play a critical role in generating poverty traps (p. 271).  Gupta, Davoodi and Terme (2001) states 
that corruption not only affects the major and most influential macroeconomic variables of the 
country but also affects the income distribution…it increases the level of poverty and 
investment is more capital based rather than labor based (p. 23). In Afghanistan the increasing 
corruption is becoming a true obstacle for the poor citizens of the country who are affected by 
it. Wei (1999) agrees with Rose-Ackerman (1997) that corruption can have severe effects on 
poor people, they receive lower social services; poor areas will be biased in terms of 
infrastructure project, high taxes, less competent in selling their agricultural products (p. 13). 
According to World Bank “corruption is the greatest obstacle to reducing poverty. Wei (1999) 
and Ackeman (1997) have made a very important point about the impact of corruption on poor 
citizens of a country. But the case is different in Afghanistan. Where there are projects 
implemented in poor areas and the people who are in real hands but usually the culture of 
corruption which has became a norm is causing a serious problem of transferring the exact 
money to these projects. The government officials have a high share through bribes and even 
then the project is implemented with no further assurance of how long it will last. Paulo Mauro 
(1996) found out that “poor countries tend to be politically unstable, bureaucratic and corrupt” 
(p. 706). 
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The lower literacy rate in Afghanistan is one of the major concerns. The country is facing 
a lower rate of literacy. Adam J, Centre of the Case Western Reserve Journal of Law in his paper 
titled “implementing anti corruption standards to improve Afghanistan’s education system” 
stresses on the point that “Afghanistan is at a pivotal moment, decades of instability, warfare, 
and the future of this war torn country relies on today’s policies and initiatives…education may 
be the most vital of these policies and initiatives” (p. 847-848).  Gupta, Dvoodi and Terme 
(2001) states that, corruption will have an impact on the quality of education, which will 
ultimately have negative effect on the government efforts to attain the required level of 
education (p.26). Gupta has presented a very logical point here. In Afghanistan you have to pay 
the bribe in order to process any educational documents through the relevant office in 
education sector. Private universities are forced to pay huge amount of money in order to 
retain their operation licenses. This in turn has crucial effect on the quality of education in 
these institutes. Cartner (2008) states that if the authorities in Afghanistan don’t control 
corruption its education goals will never be met and the country has to pay a huge opportunity 
cost in terms of education children which are the future of this country (p. 848). 
Political corruption is the worst form of corruption which gives birth to other sorts of 
corruption. The politicians in Afghanistan are highly corrupt. There are some media reports 
published on huge scandals like the Kabul Bank and many minister involved in stealing millions 
of dollars.  
Some authors and economist do believe that corruption can grease the wheel of 
development. The seminal work was presented by Nathaniel H. Leff (1964) in his paper titled 
“economic development through bureaucratic corruption” states that countries can boost 
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economic development as a result of bureaucratic system of the government….and corruption 
reduces the uncertainty involved in bad policies and reduces the higher effects of bad policy…. 
Corruption provides the insurance that if the government decides to steam in full speed in the 
wrong direction all will not be lost (p. 10-11). 
A strong rule of law plays a very vital role in a country. Afghanistan is facing severe 
problems in this part. The prevalent corruption also seems to be somehow related to the weak 
judicial system.   North (1990) as cited by Paolo Mauro (1995) states that corruption can be 
hindered by  “an efficient judicial system to enforce contracts as a crucial determinant of 
economic performance” (p. 681).  Wei (1999) states that “the ability of a country to detect acts 
of corruption and to prosecute those guilty…is essential to deter corruption (p.22). Honkong 
and Singapur are some of the asian countries where through a mix of strategies and program 
have controlled corruption in an excellent way. Svensson (2005) has given example of Hong 
Kong and Singapore as the most cited countries in terms of lowest corruption level….this 
happened as result of setting independent commission against corruption which states that 
“guilty until proven innocent”.  Afghanistan has also set up anti corruption agency. But till date 
it has not worked. The higher corruption in top government officials and bribes at lower level is 
hiddenj ust because of the networks between officials. But how does it worked in Singapore? 
Svanson (2005) states that in Singapore this program was implemented in combination of 
several other reforms in the country like higher payment to civil service employees, transfer of 
employees from one office to another, in this way it forces and acts as an opposing force to 
corrupt officials to get bribes..and political leaders are the top are committed to fight 
corruption (p. 35). Unfortunately most of the government officials as the reports and projects 
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have show are highly committed to reducing corruption. Many of the top level officials were 
publicly blamed in the media to be corrupt but no one took action. This all leads us to point at a 
weak judicial system of the country.  
Fijnaut & Hubert in their paper titled “corruption, integrity and rule of law enforcement” 
have argued the role of law enforcement organizations and the problem of corruption within 
these orgnziations (p. 03).   
Aidt (2009) takes a critical view of the two hypotheses that whether corruption greases 
the wheel of development or sands the wheel of development and found out that the 
hypothesis greasing the when does not seem to be correlated with increase in GDP (p. 271). He 
has focused also on the part of public integrity which he defines as the behavior from public 
officials in a way that will benefit him (p. 03).  
The author has further distinguished some public integrity misconducts. Fijanut & 
Hubert states that “corruption including bribery, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, fraud nd 
theft; conflict of interest through assets, jobs, gifts, manipulation of information; discrimination  
and sexual harassment improper method for noble causes (using immoral means to achieve 
moral ends); the waste and abuse of resources; and private time misconduct” (p. 04).  
Heather Marquette (2001) in her paper “donors, state building and corruption: lessons 
from Afghanistan and the implication from aid in policy” have analyzed the situation of state 
building in Afghanistan from governance, aid and anti corruption perspective (p. 1871).  
Svenson (2005) in his paper “eight questions about corruption” has asked a question 
about the common characteristics of corruption. He found out that all these countries have 
some common characteristics like they are developing or transition countries, socialist 
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government or ruled by a socialist regime and low income levels and they are closed economies 
(p.24). 
The media in Afghanistan is not free and independent. This hinders to report any kind of 
corrupt activities. According to Svensson (2005), “corrupt countries are less open and regulate 
both entry to the market and the press more” (p. 28). According to Svensson public 
procurement is highly infected by the viral disease of corruption. Svensson and Reinikke in 2004 
assessed education program in Uganda that provided education support grant to each 
student..they compared the flow of these funds from central government to the school and the 
findings show that the school received only 13 percent of the total amount of money. Olken 
(2003-04) as cited by Svensson has assessed the same situation in Indonesia where only 29 
percent of the funds allocated for road building projects and 18 percent of anti poverty 
program were stolen (p. 31). Hsieh and Moretti (2005) as cited by Svensson argues that through 
the United Nations Oil for Food Program, Iraqi regime obtained a sum of 1 to 4 billion dollars 
from 1997 to 2001 (p. 31). 
Svensson (2001) has questioned another aspect of corruption reduction technique of 
paying higher wages to bureaucrats. He has cited Becker and Stigler (1974) where they argue 
that higher wages will ultimately result in lower corruption and will ensure honest behavior 
from officials (p. 32). Rauch and Evans (2000) and Treisman (2000) as cited by Svensson (2005) 
have not found any evidence that support the hypothesis of higher wages (p. 32). Reinikka and 
Svensson (2005) found out that corruption is a leading factor in knowing the result of many 
projects in under developed countries and its failure (p. 38). 
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Caiden (2001) as cited by Graff (2005) states that “in common corruption can be attributed 
to almost anything…but while the opportunity exist everywhere, public agencies, administrative 
cultures, and geographic regions” (p. 42). 
The United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime survey in 2012 on corruption in Afghanistan 
has the following main findings.   
1. Corruption is the most important concern of adults in Afghanistan.  
2.  44.6 percentages of the household members who secured a job was through 
connections or paying bribe.  
3. The prevalence of the bribery in Afghanistan was out to be 50.1 percent. And a total of 
5.6 bribes were paid by adults to public service.  
4. Males haves faced 53.7 percent bribe prevalence than female which is 45.1 percent.  
5. More than 50 % of the bribes have been paid to province, district or municipal offices in 
comparison to bribes paid to police offices of more than 50 percent.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Data & Methodology 
The data used in this paper is the world development indicators index from World Bank. The 
data is based on six broad dimensions of government throughout the world. Following are the 
indicators.  
1. Voice and Accountability (va) (-2.5 to +2.5) 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (pos) (-2.5 to +2.5) 
3. Government Effectiveness (ge) (-2.5 to +2.5) 
4. Regulatory Quality (req) (-2.5 to +2.5) 
5. Rule of Law (rol) (-2.5 to +2.5) 
6. Control of Corruption (coc) (-2.5 to +2.5) 
There are 30 underlying data sources utilized for the calculation of these indicators 
alongside the surveys and expert assessment around the world (Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay 
and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010). The ranking of the data is done in the manner that -2.5 
represents the weak and +2.5 represents the stronger position based on these indicators. For 
example for control of corruption -2.5 represents the most corrupt and +2.5 represents the 
least corrupt.  Beside this we also have use panel data for comparative analysis. We have used a 
panel data of 8 countries namely Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, China, Singapore, Brazil, Chad 
and Nigeria. These countries are selected based on their corruption level which is almost similar 
except Singapore which is selected because of its improvement in the control of corruption. 
We have used ordinary least square regression method. Researchers have used the 
same technique in many of the published papers. The main problem with the questions and 
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researches related to corruption is that we can not quantify this very well. Following models are 
proposed.  
Model 1:  
                                                      (1)  
Model 2:  
                         (2) 
                        (3) 
Model 3: 
                                     (4) 
                                (5) 
                                (6) 
                                (7) 
Model 4: 
                                         (8) 
                                     (9) 
                                        (10) 
 We also thought to use panel data regression. Gujarati (2011) has cited Baltagi (1995) 
related to the benefits of the panel data which are,  “no bound to be heterogeneity in these 
units, which may be unobservable……the panel data is more informative, more variability, less 
co linearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” (p. 279-280). We 
have run both fixed effect and random effect model and found out that the random effect 
model is better.  
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Model 5 (Fixed Effect) 
                                                      (11) 
I=1,2,3,…………….,128; t=1,2…….,8 
Model 6 (Random Effect) 
                                                     (12) 
I=1,2,3,…………….,128; t=1,2…….,8 
Due to the less availability of data we had no other way other than coming up with 
multiple regression equations. Based on the cointegration assumption we have run all the 
regressions and results have been analyzed. Please see Appendix for the results and further 
details.  
Empirical Estimates 
Unit Root Test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test) 
Based on the time series data we had to check for stationarity of the variables in order 
to avoid the problem of spurious or nonsense regression as explained by Damodar Gujarati 
(2001). We have used the augmented dickey fuller test to check for the unit root. We cannot 
reject the null hypothesis for all the variables and conclude that all the variables are non 
stationary.  
The time series data should be stationary which means that its means and variances 
should be constant over time (Green, 2001).  In order to solve the problem of non stationary we 
took the first difference in order to see if we can come up with reliable results. But the 
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regression results were not significant. The problem with difference was that we could not take 
reliability because our data is for a limited period of time.  
Cointegration Test: 
After further analysis we thought that these variables must be cointegrated. The 
correlation was checked through Johansen test of cointegration. We found no cointegration 
among these variables all together. After further analysis we came up with the following idea to 
check for cointegration and the results were significant. The Granger Causality test is run for all 
the variables to see the causality between the variables.  
Granger Causality Test: 
The Granger Causality test is being used to see the direction of causality between all 
these variables. The granger causality test was applied through the following equation for all of 
the indicators as already mentioned. The null and alternate hypothesis is shown in the results.  
       
 
   
         
 
   
           
       
 
   
         
 
   
           
Hausman Test: 
Hausman test is used for the comparison of fixed effect and random effect model. The 
null hypothesis of Hausman test is that fixed and random effect model does not differ to a large 
extent (Guarati, 2011). 
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CHAPTER 4 
Results 
Johansen Cointegration test is run for all of the above mentioned variables.  A strong 
contergation relationship is found between control of corruption and regulatory quality at 10%, 
control of corruption and voice and accountability at 10%, coc, psav and req have atleast one 
cointegration equation at 5% and two equations at 10%, coc psav and rol have atleast one 
cointeggration equation at 5%, coc, psav and ge atlest one equation at 5%, coc, req and va have 
two cointegrated equations at 10%, coc, req and rol have two equatons at 10%, coc, req and ge 
have one at 5%, coc va and rol have one at 5% and coc rol and ge have two at 5%. All of them 
have shown strong significance based on Eigenvalues and trace test results. Please see the 
appendix for the related results.  
Table 1: Hausman Cointegration test 
 Independent Variables Test 
Control of 
Corruption 
(coc), 
ns=non 
stationary 
Political 
Stability 
& 
Absence 
of 
Violence 
(pos) 
Regulatory 
Quality  
(req) 
Voice & 
Accountability  
(vs) 
Rule of 
Law 
(rol) 
Government 
Effectiveness  
(ge) 
Cointegration 
ns/coc ns/pos     N 
ns/coc  ns/req    Y 
ns/coc   ns/va   Y 
ns/coc    ns/rol  N 
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ns/coc     ns/ge N 
ns/coc ns/pos ns/req    Y 
ns/coc ns/pos  ns/va   N 
ns/coc ns/pos   ns/rol  N 
ns/coc ns/pos    ns/ge N 
ns/coc  ns/req ns/va   Y 
ns/coc  ns/req  ns/rol  Y 
ns/coc  ns/req   ns/ge N 
ns/coc   ns/va ns/rol  Y 
ns/coc   ns/va  ns/ge Y 
ns/coc    ns/rol ns/ge Y 
Table 
2:Regression 
Non 
stationary, 
coc=dep. 1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
 
9 
 
 
10 
pos  
  0.364 
2.73    
0.445 
2.78   
rol  
  
 
0.175 
0.56 
0.232 
0.79 
-0.069 
-0.29 
-0.285 
-0.285 
-0.407 
-1.34  
ge  
  
   
0.312 
6.18  
0.644 
3.19 
0.437 
2.24 
req  
0.486 
4.89 
0.16 
0.69 
0.396 
4.62 
0.509 
4.62   
0.337 
3.09 
-0.611 
-1.69 
-0.319 
-1.08 
va   
0.29 
1.53   
0.442 
5.19    
0.088 
0.46 
Stationary 
Variables           
Dpos 
0.666 
t=2          
DDge 
0.326 
1.99          
DDreq 
-0.530 
-1.4          
DDDva 
-0.385 
-1.66          
Drol 
-0.091 
-0.17          
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The results from Model 1 show very insignificant results even they are stationary 
variables. Political stability and violence and government effectiveness are significant at 10% 
significance. The t-statistics is significant for political stability in comparison to 1.99 to 
government effectiveness. The value of R-squared shows that the model is 48% percent 
reliable, The F-statistics value is very low. This shows that globally that model is not significant 
at all. 
Based on the cointegrated nature of control of corruption and regulatory quality we run 
the OLS regression and the results are highly significant at 95% confidence interval. The trace 
test shows the reliability of the coefficient which is significantly higher. The F test is 23.95 which 
show that the model is over all fit. R-squared explains the model 63%. we expected a positive 
sign of the coefficient of regulatory quality. We found out 0.48, which means that a one point 
increase in regulatory quality of the government will have an impact of 1 point increment in 
control of corruption.  
 We also observed a strong cointegration (check appendix for Johansen Cointegration 
test) between control of corruption and voice and accountability. The coefficients are 
significant with 95% confidence interval. Trace test shows a value of 5.41 for the coefficient of 
voice and accountability which is significant. The value of R-squared shows 68% accuracy of the 
model which is quite good. We expected a positive sign of coefficient of voice and 
accountability and the results also shows positive sign. A one point increase in voice and 
No Obs. 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
F Test 1.32 23.95 14.3 21.15 11.54 14.53 20.42 14.25 16.51 14.15 
R-Squared 0.48 0.63 0.68 0.76 0.63 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.8 0.77 
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accountability will have an impact on corruption of one plus point which means strong hold on 
the control of corruption.  
A strong cointegration was found between control of corruption, political stability and 
violence and regulatory quality. This means that in the long run these variables behave in the 
same pattern. The results from the regression show highly significant values for the coefficient 
of both the independent variables. They are significant at 95% confidence interval. The trace 
test show shat the coefficients are significant. The F statistics has a value of 21.15 which is 
highly significant. The value of R-squared is 0.76 which shows the reliability of the model. A one 
point increment in both political stability and regulatory quality will have an impact of 0.36 and 
0.39 on the control of corruption.  
We also found at least one cointegration equation between control of corruption, 
regulatory quality and rule of law. But the results from regression show only one significant 
coefficient for regulatory quality. The global F statistics shows a value of 11.54 which states that 
the model is explained in the best possible way by these variables. Rule of law is not significant 
in this case.  
Results from this equation show only significance in voice and accountability. Controls of 
corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness are also conitegrated but the results from 
regressions shows only one significant coefficient with a strong trace test results.  
In model 04 which is a combination of multiple equations. We found a strong 
relationship between 1) control o corruption, political stability and violence, regulatory quality 
and rule of law 2) control of corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality 3) control of corruption, regulatory quality, government effectiveness and 
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voice and accountability. The results show that political stability and violence and regulatory 
quality are highly significant at 95% confidence interval. The trace test result for both 
regulatory quality and political stability and violence is 3.09 and 2.78 which is significant as well. 
A one point increase in pos will have an impact of 0.44 point and a one point increase in 
regulatory quality will have an impact of 0.33 points on the control of corruption. The 
coefficient of rule of law is not significant. The results from control of corruption, rule of law, 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality shows only significance for government 
effectiveness at 95% confidence interval. The results from last model 10 show significance for 
government effectiveness at 95% confidence interval.  
Table 3: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1996 2011 
Lags: 2 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-
Statistic 
Prob.  Decision  
 GE does not Granger Cause COC  14  0.04614 0.9551 no 
 COC does not Granger Cause GE  3.90627 0.0601 yes 
          
 PSAV does not Granger Cause COC  14  0.00224 0.9978 no 
 COC does not Granger Cause PSAV  4.65602 0.0409 yes 
          
 REQ does not Granger Cause COC  14  0.42972 0.6634 no 
 COC does not Granger Cause REQ  4.08469 0.0547 yes 
          
 ROL does not Granger Cause COC  14  0.46156 0.6444 no 
 COC does not Granger Cause ROL  3.21452 0.0884 yes 
          
 VA does not Granger Cause COC  14  0.34428 0.7177 no 
 COC does not Granger Cause VA  9.83540 0.0054 yes 
          
 PSAV does not Granger Cause GE  14  0.08207 0.9219 no 
 GE does not Granger Cause PSAV  0.20149 0.8211 no 
          
 REQ does not Granger Cause GE  14  1.42012 0.2911 no 
 GE does not Granger Cause REQ  0.28263 0.7602 no 
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 ROL does not Granger Cause GE  14  0.37153 0.6998 no 
 GE does not Granger Cause ROL  24.3158 0.0002 yes 
          
 VA does not Granger Cause GE  14  1.15582 0.3575 no 
 GE does not Granger Cause VA  0.13699 0.8738 no 
          
 REQ does not Granger Cause PSAV  14  0.00328 0.9967 no 
 PSAV does not Granger Cause REQ  0.99260 0.4078 no 
          
 ROL does not Granger Cause PSAV  14  1.28149 0.3238 no 
 PSAV does not Granger Cause ROL  0.65496 0.5426 no 
          
 VA does not Granger Cause PSAV  14  0.11102 0.8961 no 
 PSAV does not Granger Cause VA  0.44592 0.6536 no 
          
 ROL does not Granger Cause REQ  14  0.52165 0.6104 no 
 REQ does not Granger Cause ROL  5.73748 0.0248 yes 
          
 VA does not Granger Cause REQ  14  0.58848 0.5752 no 
 REQ does not Granger Cause VA  0.08991 0.9148 no 
          
 VA does not Granger Cause ROL  14  2.59630 0.1288 no 
 ROL does not Granger Cause VA  0.36362 0.7049 no 
     
     
 
 The null hypothesis is mentioned in the table 3 above. The granger causality test shows 
that control of corruption granger causes government effectiveness, political stability and 
violence, regulatory quality and rule of law. These are all significant at 5% and some of the 
variables below 10%. Government effectiveness and regulatory quality are found to granger 
cause rule of law at below 10%.  
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Table 04: Fixed Effect Model 
Dependent Variable: COC 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 1996 2011 
Periods included: 16 
Cross-sections included: 8 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 127 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.101494 0.052441 1.935382 0.0554 
Pos 0.072569 0.029932 2.424428 0.0169 
Rol 0.422489 0.066629 6.340913 0.0000 
Req 0.161067 0.056656 2.842874 0.0053 
Ge 0.066267 0.045609 1.452938 0.1490 
Va 0.212213 0.043930 4.830657 0.0000 
     
     
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.993948     Mean dependent var -0.413386 
Adjusted R-squared 0.993311     S.D. dependent var 1.127242 
S.E. of regression 0.092191     Akaike info criterion -1.833177 
Sum squared resid 0.968902     Schwarz criterion -1.542040 
Log likelihood 129.4068     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.714892 
F-statistic 1560.316     Durbin-Watson stat 1.210122 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 06: Hausman Test 
 Fixed Effect Model  Random Effect Model Difference Sqrt(S.E) 
rol 0.4224894 0.4631093 -0.0406199 0.0245429 
req 0.1610672 0.2059062 -0.0448389 0.0161168 
ge 0.0662666 0.0729904 -0.0067238  
Table 05: Random Effect Model 
Dependent Variable: COC 
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 1996 2011 
Periods included: 16 
Cross-sections included: 8 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 127 
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.132099 0.122557 1.077860 0.2832 
cos 0.076653 0.029663 2.584096 0.0110 
rol 0.463019 0.061129 7.574450 0.0000 
req 0.205785 0.053596 3.839532 0.0002 
ge 0.072966 0.045300 1.610723 0.1098 
va 0.194767 0.042722 4.558890 0.0000 
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
Cross-section random 0.319798 0.9233 
Idiosyncratic random 0.092191 0.0767 
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.648879     Mean dependent var -0.030035 
Adjusted R-squared 0.634370     S.D. dependent var 0.154555 
S.E. of regression 0.093430     Sum squared resid 1.056234 
F-statistic 44.72215     Durbin-Watson stat 1.141516 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.903336     Mean dependent var -0.413386 
Sum squared resid 15.47646     Durbin-Watson stat 0.077906 
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va 0.2122127 0.1947048 0.0175079 0.0074268 
pos 0.0725687 0.0766631 -0.0040944  
Fixed Effect=consistent under null hypothesis  
Fixed Effect Different=difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(5)=10.39 
Prob>Chi2=0.0649 
 
 
 
Table 07:  Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
pos 0.072569 0.076653 0.000016 0.3076 
rol 0.422489 0.463019 0.000703 0.1263 
req 0.161067 0.205785 0.000337 0.0149 
ge 0.066267 0.072966 0.000028 0.2059 
va 0.212213 0.194767 0.000105 0.0882 
 
  We can see from the results that the fixed effect and random effect model gives us 
different results. The coefficient values are different with very little difference. In table 6 we 
can see that the difference among the variables between fixed effect and random effect is very 
low.  In the fixed effect model all the variables are highly significant and trace test results are 
also highly significant for all variables. The only insignificant variable is government 
effectiveness both in random and fixed effect model. The rule of law and voice and 
accountability variables are found to be highly significant and have a higher impact on the 
control of corruption in out panel data. In the time series regression for Afghanistan only we 
found rule of law to be not significant that may be because less data in the case of Afghanistan.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion & Recommendations 
This research paper is about troubleshooting the code of corruption in Afghanistan. We 
wanted to know the impact of five development indicators on the control of corruption in 
Afghanistan. We also run a panel data regression to see the impact of these variables in a panel 
data of 8 countries namely Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Singapore, China, Brazil, Chad, Nigeria. 
This is one of the most important issues in and has both economical and social consequences. 
Control of corruption, voice and accountability, regulatory quality and government 
effectiveness are found to be strongly cointegrated besides other variables which are 
significantly cointegrated but the regression results are weak. In summary a policy that will 
work in joint coordination on rule of law, government effectiveness and voice and 
accountability will have an impact on the control of corruption. Following are some of the 
policy recommendations. 
Policy Recommendations 
  The problem is multidimensional, especially in the context of Afghanistan. Based on our 
results we propose the following policy recommendations for the effective control of 
corruption in Afghanistan.  
1. The government of Afghanistan should focus on the regulatory quality of the public sector in 
order to provide better services to general public.  
2. The government should extend efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Afghanistan and to 
make public officials accountable for their actions which are against the rule of law. This rule 
should also apply to the judicial officials of the government of Afghanistan. 
30 
 
 
 
3. The citizens of Afghanistan should also play a role so that to make themselves as well as 
others accountable for actions related to corruption. They should also be accountable for the 
cases where they pay bribes to officials.  
4. Afghan government should maintain political stability through a movement towards a more 
democratic form of the government. 
5. In joint; the variables namely rule of law voice and accountability, government effectiveness 
and regulatory quality should be strongly improved; this will have a higher impact on the 
control of corruption in the country based on empirical results.  
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Appendix A 
 
A) Johansen Test for Cointegration 
 
Table 08: Johansen Cointegration Test 
 
Included Observations: 14 after adjustment 
Trend Assumption: linear deterministic assumption 
Lags interval(in first difference): 1 to 1 
Series  coc and ge  
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical 
Value 
Prob** 
Non* 0.745605 21.85338  15.49471 0.0048 
At most 1 0.174766 2.689233 3.841466 0.1010 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level  
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
Series  coc req 
Non* 0.346610 9.138975 15.49471 0.3527 
At most 1 0.203241 3.180835 3.841466 0.0745 
Trace test indicates no cointegrating equation at 0.05 level 
 
Series  coc va 
Non* 0.548161 14.08448 15.49471 0.0806 
At most 1 0.190717 2.962487 3.840466 0.0852 
Trace test indicates no cointegrating equation at 0.05 level.  
 
Series   coc rol  
Non* 0.352066 8.197201 15.49471 0.4446 
At most 1 0.140623 2.121670 3.841466 0.1452 
Trace test indicates no cointegrating equation at 0.05 level  
 
Series  coc pos 
Non* 0.332762 8.045831 15.49471 0.4605 
At most 1 0.156415 2.381320 3.841466 0.1228 
Trace test indicates no cointegrating equation at 0.05 level 
 
Series coc pos req 
None* 0.942314 55.18120 29.79707 0.0000 
At most 1 0.578245 15.24280 15.494471 0.0545 
At most 2 0.201835 3.156157 3.841466 0.0756 
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Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 0.05 level 
 
Series  coc pos va 
None* 0.815425 30.52076 29.79707 0.0412 
At most 1 0.264459 6.864947 15.49471 0.5934 
At most 2 0.167402 2.564869 3.841466 0.1093 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 0.05 level 
 
Series  coc pos  rol  
None* 0.813455 30.96194 29.79707 0.0366 
At most 1 0.316070 7.454749 15.49471 0.5254 
At most 2 0.141512 2.136161 3.841466 0.1439 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 0.05 level 
 
Series  coc pos ge 
None* 0.965189 55.77950 29.79707 0.0000 
At most 1 0.360817 8.770078 15.49471 0.3871 
At most 2 0.163785 2.504176 3.841466 0.1135 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 0.05 level 
 
Series  coc req va 
None* 0.723147 26.14150 29.79707 0.1245 
At most 1 0.305893 8.161744 15.49471 0.4483 
At most 2 0.195755 3.049927 3.841466 0.0807 
Trace test indicates no cointegrating equation at 0.05 level 
     
Series  coc req rol  
None* 0.962101 67.04471 29.79707 0.0000 
At most 1 0.757467 21.22501 15.49471 0.0061 
At most 2 0.094670 1.392374 3.841466 0.2380 
Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equations at 0.05 level 
 
Series  coc req ge 
None* 0.916912 41.00411 29.79707 0.0017 
At most 1 0.356097 6.174056 15.49471 0.6750 
At most 2 0.000797 0.011158 3.841466 0.9156 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equations at 0.05 level 
 
Series coc va rol    
None* 0.716256 31.54394 29.79707 0.0311 
At most 1 0.569955 13.90837 15.49471 0.0855 
At most 2 0.138940 2.094269 3.841466 0.1479 
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Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equations at 0.05 level 
 
Series  coc va ge 
None* 0.919667 50.02847 29.79707 0.0001 
At most 1 0.560926 14.72284 15.49471 0.0651 
At most 2 0.204309 3.199623 3.841466 0.0737 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equations at 0.05 level 
 
Series  Coc rol ge    
None* 0.935591 64.70410 29.79707 0.0000 
At most 1 0.825999 26.30897 15.49471 0.0008 
At most 2 0.122361 1.827283 3.741466 0.1764 
Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equations at 0.05 level 
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